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ELIMINATION OF IMPROPER EVIDENCE.
(Concluded)

Excluding Ab Initio Not Equivalent To Striking Out
While the justification for striking but evidence
would generally be a justification for refusing to admit
the evidence at all, the court will not always defer the
decision to admit or not, until hearing the evidence in
objection. An ejectment was brought in 1860.
The
deposition of a witness for the plaintiff, taken July 23d,
1861, was unobjectionable on its face.
Defendant alleged that portions of it were only hearsay, and offered
a deposition of the same witness, taken Sept. 7th, 1867
in which the deponent said that portions of the first
deposition were hearsay. The court declined to suspend
the reading of the deposition of 1861, to hear that of
1867. "In a proper case," says Agnew, J., "a court may
hear an objection from the opposite side to exclude offered evidence," but justifies the refusal here by suggesting that during the six years intervening between the
two depositions, a change of circumstances or other influences may have affected the feelings of the witness,
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or his memory. It would be more conducive to justice
to hear the whole evidence, and then exclude the testimony by an instruction to the jury, if the circumstances
warrant it., If the witness, on cross-examination, said
that what he had said on the examination in chief was
hearsay, the court would, on request, strike out the whole
evidence. The injection of five years between the
primary and the secondary testimony, forbids the reiection of the former.
Omission To Move To Strike Out
If an offer is made to which there is no objection
urged, and the evidence presented fails to come up to
the offer, it is not the duty of the court to eliminate it,
unless it is requested by a motion to strike out, or to
instruct the jury to disregard. Prosecution for the theft
of chickens one Saturday night in January. The offer
was to show' that the commonwealth's witness bought
chickens from the defendant early on Monday morning
in January. The witness said he bought chickens from
the defendant but could not determine whether he bought
them in January.2

Conditional Admission
Evidence may be admitted provisionally and the
conditions not being fulfilled may be stricken out. A
written admission by A, that his land does not extend
beyond a certain line, would be admissible in ejectment,
if A was owner when he made the admission. It was
objected that he had already conveyed the land to B.
The court admitted the paper subject to the court's in]Rider v. Maul, 70 Pa. 15.
2Co0 v. Craig, 19 Super. 81. The court mentions that the
answer could not injure the defendant. Moreover no motion to
strike out, or instruct the jury to disregard it, was made. Hence,
no error.
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struction to disregard it, if the jury should find that
the deed from A to B had been delivered, when the writing was made, Afterwards, in the general charge, the
paper was fully and entirely withdrawn from the consideration of the jury. It could be -so withdrawn as not
to prejudice the party against whom it was admitted3
In a prosecution for conspiracy, evidence is admitted on
condition that the district -attorney follows it up with
other specific evidence. If the condition is not complied
with there is no error unless the defendant moves the
court to strike out the evidence given, and the motion
Whether A and B were partners was a
is refused.4
Declarations of C, that they were, were ofquestion.
fered to affect A. Their admissibility depended on C's
being agent for A. The court admitted the declarations,
"on the proposition that later there will be evidence of
his -agency." "If that is not proved, it all falls." Evidence of the agency was not subsequently presented.
The court, in its charge said, "the evidence had been admitted in the expectation of proof of agency, and therefore the jury will simply exclude statements made by
C." It was too late thus to withdraw the evidence2
Evidence Insufficient
In a murder case, the commonwealth 'alleges that the
murder was of the first degree because (a) done with
the intention to produce death; (b) because done in the
perpetration of a robbery. Evidence tending to show a
robbery was admitted, but before the. final argument of
the district attorney, the judge informed him and subsequently charged the jury that the evidence of robbery
was insufficient to sustain a verdict on that hypothesis.
3

ewing v. Alcorn, 40 Pa. 492. Of. iWeettigan v. Potts, 149
Pa. 155.
4
Com. v. Donnelly, 40 Super. 116.
AHoron v. Phipps, 246 Pa. 294.
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Since it was in the prisoner's favor, he could not allege
error because not given till his counsel had argued the
case.6
Comparative Importance
The probable influence of the evidence, as convincing the jury, as awakening prejudice, is sometimes adverted to, in deciding whether the striking out or instructing to disregard, is effectual to neutralize the error of admitting the evidence. The evidence may be
comparatively unimportant.
It will then be easy to
suppose that after it is stricken out, it ceases to affect
the jurors' minds. It may be important. Then its effect may remain, despite the court's effort to extirpate
it.7
Reference is accordingly simetimes made to the
tendency of the evidence to induce an improper verdict,'
to prejudice the jury, 9 to inflame the damages, 10 to bias
the jury against the opposite party, as such, or as a wit1
ness.1
Rebutting The Evidence
After the party, adversely affected by the improper
evidence, not objecting to it, counters it by rebutting evidence, the court may refuse to entertain a motion to
strike it out. 12
OCom. v. Razmus, 210 Pes 609.
7,Canal Co. v. Birnes, 31 Ps. 193.

Wartin v. Baden Borough, 233 Pa. 452; Heron v. Phipps, 246
Pa. 2949
Xuntingdon R. R. v. Decker, 82 Pa, 119; Erie, etc. R. R. v.
Smitfh, 125 Pa. 259; Hamony v. Pa. etc. F. R-, 222 Pa. 631; Ewing
v. Alcorn, 40 Pa. 492.
1oPenna. R
1 . R. v. Butlers, 57 Pa. 335.
"Albert v. Miller, 7 W. N. 477.
l'Perry v- Perry, 20 PRttsbg. L. J. 147.
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Evidence Received Without Objection
The doctrine is affirmed in some cases, that when
evidence has been received without objection, the court's
refusal to strike it out is not error, of which advantage
can be taken in the appellate court, 13 even if the motion
to strike out is made as early as at the close of the crossexamination. Perhaps, a qualification of this statement
is that the .ground of objection must be visible to the
opposite party, if he exercises due diligence."' The evidence may be received under an agreement of the-counsel of both parties. The court may then properly refuse
subsequently to strike it out."
Cross-Examination On The Objectionable Evidence
When a party attempts to gain an advantage from
the objectionable evidence by cross-examination upon it,
it will probably be too late to have it stricken out
though the cross-examination, instead of developing evidence favorable to the cross-examiner, evokes unfavorable evidence.26 In a mechanics' lien case, the lien and
bill of particulars were put in evidence by the plaintiff,
without objection. Defendant used them in cross-examination, and the bill of particulars was referred to in
such a way as to make it part of the defendant's testimony. An objection then taken by the defendant,
which might possibly be treated as a motion to strike out,
17
was properly refused.
13Lowrey v. Robinson, 141 Pa. 189; Montgomery v. Cunning-%
ham, 104 Pa. 349; Oswvald v. Kennedy, 48' Pa. 9; Dallmeyer v.
Dallmeyer, 16 Atlan. 72.
14Robinson v. Snyder, 25 Pa. 203.
15"ong v. Girdwood, 150 Pa. 413.
16Hannum v. Povnall, 187 Pa. 292. The evidence entered
without fault of the court. No motion to strike out was made.
On the contrary the witness was cross-examined. No error was
therefore committed by the court. Cf. Oswald v. Kennedy, 48

Pa, 9.
"1Brown v- Kolb, 8 Super. 413.
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Evidence Commented On In Closing Speech
The effect of evidence, it is supposed, may be so far
deepened by the arguments of counsel upon it, that a direction in the charge to disregard it will not be deemed
effectual, in spite of the presumed deference of the jury
to the authority of the judge. Hence a party, cannot,
after using -the evidence in argument, and commenting
upon it, require the court to withdraw the testimony
from the jury.28
Evidence Not Withdrawn Till After Argument
The postponement of the withdrawal of the evidence
until the final arguments have been made, makes the
withdrawal ineffectual, to remove the error in receiving
the evidence even though it does not appear that the arguments made any use of the improper evidence. That
they did, is taken for granted, if the evidence had any
utility for the party putting it in. Reference is made,
e. g. to the fact that the evidence remained with the jury
until the proofs, exhibits and. -argument had closed upon
both sides. 19
When the evidence is withdrawn before
argument and there is no good reason to believe that the
defendant will be prejudiced by it, its having been received is not a reason for withdrawing a juror. Suit
for personal injuries from falling on -a platform. Certain witnesses were permitted to testify that the platform and approaches from the station to the tracks were
dangerous. Before argument this testimony was stricken out. No error 'vas committed for which there should
be a reversal.2
',McInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa. 118; Rees v. Livingston, 41 Pa. 113.
19
Canal Co. v. Bwrnes, 31 Pa. 193; Rosenstiel v. Pittsburgh
Piways Co., 230 Pa. 273; Penna. R. R. v. Butler, 57 Pa. 335; Al.
bert v. Miller, 7 W. N. 477; Heron v. Phipps, 246 Pa. 294.
2'Rathgebe v. Pnna. R.. R., 179 Pa. 81.
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Immediate Striking Out
If evidence, though improperly received, is immediately struck out on the request of the party adversely
affected by it, and no reference to it is made subsequently, no error will have been committed, of which advantage may be taken in the appellate court,21 or which would
be ground for granting a new trial, 22 if it does not ap-

pear that injury was done by the admission.
Delay In Making Motion
Proceeding to assess damages for the taking of land
by the city of Philadelphia, for a reservoir. Many witnesses for the plaintiff 'were examined without objection. They were cross-examined. After the trial had
lasted two days, and 150 pages of testimony had been
taken, a motion was made by defendant to strike from
the record, -so much of the evidence as expressed estimates of what would have been the value of the property,
if cut up into lots, if streets were opened. The court
properly refused.

Besides the delay,23 in making the

motion, the court adverted to the circumstance that 'had
the motion been granted, it would have been very difficult for the 'parties to know how much of the testimony
had been stricken out.2 Action against B for injury -by
an automobile which belonged to S, and was in the control of B when the accident occurred. S testified for the
plaintiff that the car which did the injury was his. His
cross-examination showed that he knew of the accident
and of its cause only from C, his chauffeur. Defendant
made no motion to strike out the evidence. The plaintiff
2 Mitchell v. Edeburn, 37 Super. 223; The trial court refused
to withdraw a juror on account of the adnission of the evidence.
Cf. U'angst v. Kraenter, 8 W. & ;. 391.
22Ruddy v. Ruddy, 6 KuIp. 297.
23Delay is referred to in Canal Co. v. Barnes, 31 Pa. 19$.

24Warden v. Philadelphia, 167 Pa. 523.
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continued to present his evidence, and on the evening of
the same day, moved for a non-suit. This being refused,
defendant's counsel opened his case. On the next morning, a motion was made to strike out S's testimony. S
had left the court. As the defendant knew that the
testimony was based on hearsay, he should have objected to the evidence or moved immediately to strike it
out.25

Suit on an accident policy.

Evidence of an au-

topsy was given by the plaintiff, without objection.
The constitution of the defendant company required that
it should be given reasonable notice to attend the autopsy.
After the plaintiff's testimony was all in, and a part of
the defendant's, the latter asked the court to strike out
the evidence for the plaintiff, because no opportunity
had been given to attend the autopsy.
The court refused, because no objection to the evidence was made,
and the motion to strike out was not made until the
plaintiff's case in chief was closed. In so doing, there
was no abuse of discretion. 2 9
Instruction In Charge Of Court
An instruction in the charge of the court to disregard
the evidence which has been improperly admitted, or an
order then made to strike out the evidence, is too late
to save the judgment from reversal.27

Evidence in a

murder case, of declarations by A to B, is received, in
the expectation that they will be shown to have been
communicated by B to the defendant. This evidence is
not furnished. It is too late to tell the jury in the
25SLuckett v. Reighard, 248 Pa., 24.
26McCullough v. Railway Mail Assn., 225 Pa. 118.
27Martin v. Badien Borough, 233 Pa. 452; Canal Co. v. Barnes,

31 Pa. 193; Pennat. R. R- v. Butler, .57 Pa. 335; Iuningid'n R. R.
v. Decker, 82 Pa. 119; Brie etc. R. R. v. Smith, 125 Pa. 259; Ham-

ony v. Penna. etc. R. R., 222 Pa. 631; Albert v. Miller, ! W. N.
477; Heron v. Pbippa, 246 Pa. 294; Com.. v. 2911, 94 Pa. 258.
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charge to discard the evidence of such declaratIons."
Yet, the principle that withdrawal of evidence in the
charge is too late, is not always applied.
Act ion for
damages for the taking of land by a railroad company.
Plaintiff's land extended to low water mark. A witness was allowed to testify where the low water line
had been, in front of the plaintiff's property before a
certain dam had been constructed. This should have
been rejected because the former position of low water
mark was irrelevant. The admission was however held
to have been made harmless by the instructions in the
general charge, and in the answer to a point, that the
low water mark was the present, not the former, low
water mark.2 9 In an action on a fire policy, the court
admitted evidence, improperly, that the erection of certain structures, which increased the risk, was known to
an agent of the company. The court withdrew the evidence only in its charge, saying it should have no influence on the judgment of the jurors. The agent's knowledge would not bind the company, nor relieve the plaintiff from the obligation to keep the condition. Affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, Gordon, J., observes,
the evidence "ought not to have been received, but the
court not only withdrew this evidence, but expressly instructed the jury that Darr's (the agent's) knowledge
28Corm v. Zell, 94 Pa. 258- In an action against a railroad
for killing a man, the -grandfather -of the minor child of the
deceased, testified that the child -was entirely dependent on the
witness for support.
A statement in the charge .fhat it rfts
wrong to admit -the evidence was too late. It should have been
struck out at or before the close of -the testimony. Pa. R. R.
v. Butler, 57 Pa. S35.
z9McGunnigle v. R. R. Go., 213 Pa. 383. A witness said he
would make a certain valuation of the land, if there rwas L%right
in plaintiff to fill up out toDa so-called "harbor line" which was
below the low water line. 'Te court in its charge said that the
verdict could not be based on any use of the -land -which contemplated the filling of -the river to the harbor line.
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could not affect the company."3 0 In a trial for murder,
testimony for the commonwealth was -admitted, despite
objection, that the defendant's sister had said in his
presence, that she had seen him coming hastily from the
direction of the fire, on the night of the murder. The
prisoner had at the time said that she was a liar. Although
the court stated in its charge that the prisoner was not
affected by the accusation made in his presence, which
he had denied, the Supreme Court says the error of admitting the testimony was not thus cured. "It cannot
be assumed that the effect of the accusation of a sister
could be removed from the mind of the jurors in this
way-.,P31

Reasons For Eliminating Evidence-Interest
The reasons for the purgation of the case from certain evidence, may be various. After a witness -hastestified, he may be found by the opposite party to be
disqualified because interested. That party may have
his testimony stricken out or withdrawn from consideration, if ordinary care would not have discovered the
fact on which the interest depended, before the testimony
was received.32 On the evidence as to the interest of a
proposed witness, the court thought 'him without interest, and admitted him. On his cross-examination, he admitted that he was interested. The court instructed the
jury not to consider his testimony. 33
30 Franklin Hire Ins. Co. v. Graver, 10 Pa. 266.

Worom. v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 607.
32Robinson v. Snyder, 25 P& 203; MaInroy v. Dyer, 47 Pa.
118.

If

the

court

doubting

on what side the interests of the

'witness preponderates, admits him, telling the jury that if it preponderates in :avor of the party calling 'him, they should reject

his testimony, -no other action is necessary.
41 Pa. W12.
13 Leetor v. McDowell, 1 Pa. 91.

Rees v. Livingston,
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Does Not Come Up To Offer
An offer may be made of evidence which would be
relevant and proper, which the court may decide to admit. If the evidence given under it does not come up to
the offer, and for that reason is inadmissible, it may be
"formally withdrawn from the jury," and the defendant,
even in a murder case, cannot successfully contend that
the reception of it was error.3 4 A witness is called to
testify to a parol statement, made simultaneously with
a written agreement, and qualifying it. The statement
he proves preceded the -agreement, and therefore was
inadmissible. The court should, in answer to a point
offered by the party adversely affected, tell the jury to
disregard the evidence. 5 Offer to prove that B, as agent
of C made a contract with A for the purchase from A of
poles. Evidence of the purchase by B but none of the
agency for C, was given. The evidence then should be
In an instruck out on the request of C, defendant."
cest case, the court allowed the prosecutrix (daughter
of defendant) to say that she had complained to her
brothers and sisters, near the time of the occurrence.
She stated that she complained five or six months after
the occurrence. Probably, on motion to strike out this
answer would have been stricken out. There was no
error in allowing it to stand in the absence of such a
motion.az A witness was admitted, under a statement of
his proposed evidence. The evidence delivered by him
did not correspond with that proposed. The judge ought
34

Com. v. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304.
asRearick v. Reeaick, 16 Pa. 66.
86 Central Pa. Telephone Co. v. Thompson, 112 Pa. 118.
37CoM. v. Bell, 166 Pa. 405. The court suggests that it M"
not alleged that the answer was in any degree prejudicial to
the defendant. Hence there was no error in the fact -that the
,ftnes's statement 'was made.
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then, in answer to a point, to tell the jury to disregard
it.3s
Answer Not Responsive
The mere fact that an answer is not responsive to a
question, would not require that it be ignored by the
jury or that it be stricken out. But, if it is irrelevant;
if it is founded on hearsay, if it is intrinsically inadmissible, it will be stricken out on request of the party to be
adversely affected by it.39 Action for personal injuries.
Plaintiff is asked how he would estimate the amount of
business he could have done, while disabled, if he had
not been injured. He answered, $500.
The answer
would have been stricken out on motion.40 Prosecution
for statutory rape.
To an unobjectionable question
put by the commonwealth, to a witness, the answer was
not responsive, and contained hearsay, viz, a statement
that the prosecutrix admitted 'the connection. It was
41
error to refuse, on motion, to strike out this answer.
Reason For Eliminating Becomes Irrelevant
Evidence apparently relevant when admitted, may
become irrelevant by a 'subsequent change in the claim
of the defendant. Thus on ejectment, he may attempt
at first to make out a title by adverse possession, and in
doing so, prove improvements made by him.
Subsequently other testimony may render this evidence immaterial and incompetent. The court would, if requested,

direct the jury to disregard

it.2

38Rearick v. Rearick, 15 Pa. 66.

In a murder case, the

39Hannuan v. Pownall, 187 Pa. 292.
40
Marshall v. Lehigh V. R. R., 240 Pa. 272. Not being -requested, -the court committed no error in not striking it out. Cf.
Broadnax v. R. R. Co., 1.57 Pa. 140.
4'Com. v- Howe, 35 :Sup. 554.
4
2Aitken's Heirs v. Young, 12 Pa. 15.
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killing being alleged to have occurred in a robbery, the
acts of persons alleged to have been in a conspiracy with
the defendant to rob, were proved. Subsequently it appeared that defendant was not in the alleged conspiracy.
On the request of defendant, the court was under obligation to withdraw this evidence. 43 Sometimes evidence
is received, whose relevancy depends on the proof, not
yet forthcoming, of other facts. If this additional evidence fails to be presented, the court will properly withdraw the evidence already received, either by striking it
out, or instructing the jury to disregard it, or otherwise.

44

Is Irrelevant
The evidence may be irrelevant at the time of its
Thus, in an action on a
reception, and be clearly so.
contract for boating on a canal, made in April, 1851, proposals for contracts, made by the defendant in Feb.,
1851 and containing stipulations for a sufficient supply
of water in the canal, which stipulations were not inserted in the contract of April, 1851, were irrelevant. Under
the contract no liability of the defendant was developed,
but there had been a failure of water, and a consequent
impeding of navigation, for the loss arising from which
the plaintiff claimed compensation. The court, having
improperly received proof of the advertisement, should
have withdrawn it promptly and fully, from the consideration of the jury. 5 In action for removal of lateral
support, the court admits evidence of damage to house,
fence and chicken house, in the expectation that proof
43 Com. v. Wilson, 186 Pa. 1.

44Stewart v. Huntingdon Bank, 11 *S. & R. 267. The admitted evidence was a bond. The proof of its relevancy failing to
appear, the court refused to send it out with the jury, or to allow counsel to argue upon it. Cf. Central Pa. Telephone Co. v
Thompson, 42 Pa. 118.
SDelavire, etc- Canal Co. v. Barnes, 31 Pa. 193.
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of defendant's negligence will follow, without which the
evidence is irrelevant. No proof of negligence followed.
The evidence as to damage to house, fence, and chicken
house, was on motion stricken out."' That school directors think, at the trial, that they would not have
voted to -accept a contract for school furniture, had they
not understood it as they now ask the court to understand it, is irrelevant. The court having admitted such
evidence, may strike it out, before the argument of counsel.

47

Withholding Better Evidence -Untruthfulness
The discovery that a plaintiff has put in evidence
of inferior reliability, while in possession of better, is no
ground for striking out the former. In an action for injuries, arising from an -accident occasioned by depressions in a street, the plaintiff called witnesses to testify,
by estimates, of the size and depth of the depressions.
It then appeared that the plaintiff had had a survey or
made measurements, which he did not put in evidence.
This did not make it the duty of the court, on motion, to
strike out the "eye measurements."
The judge explained to the jury that they might draw an unfavorable inference from the non-production of the surveyor's
measurements, unless the plaintiff had satisfactorily explained it.,, A physician testifying to injuries on crossexamination as to his qualifiations, states that he has
been licensed to practice in Pennsylvania, After this,
defendant proves that he has not been registered here.
The court declined, thereupon to grant a motion to strike
out his testimony. He was the plaintiff's physician de
4

cGettigan v. Potts, 149 Pa. 165.
47Furniture Oo. v. School District, 1'58 Pa. 35. Thompson,
J., thought it difficult to see that the -rejected, evidence, "cast a
taint upon the relevant testimony."
'SHarvey v. Chester, 211 Pa. 663.
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facto.

His falsehood might affect his credit, but not

justify the exclusion of his testimony.

9

Refusal To Stand Cross-Examination
After a witness is examined in chief, his refusal to
submit to a cross-examination will justify the striking
out of the testimony already delivered.' In an ejectment, it was proved that when the deposition of S was
offered, he refused to answer questions on crossexamination. This justified the rejection of the deposition.2 Bill in equity for a partnership account. The plaintiff is a witness. Before his cross-examination, defendant
becomes sick and dies. Though the plaintiff offers himself for cross-examination, neither the administrator of
the deceased nor his counsel, accepts -the opportunity.
The court will not strike out the evidence elicited in the
examination in chief.s A witness, after stating facts
which incriminated another, refused to answer a question on the ground that the answer would tend to incriminate himself. Though the court would not compel him
to answer, it would, if he refused, strike out the testi..
4
mony given.
Objection To Part Of Deposition
Of a deposition all was admitted, except parts based
on hearsay, and proving contents of writings not shown
to have been lost.
The rejection of these parts does
49MdDyer v. East Penna. Rys. Co., 227 'P. 641. The Supreme Court observes that after evidence has been received without objecton, the refusal to strike out is not reviewable.
"Wilson's Will, 12 Dist. 649. Petition for issue devisavit
vel non.
2ftonebraker 'v.Short, 8 Pa. 165.
Way' Appeal, 91 Pa. 265.
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not compel the court to strike out the other parts which
have been admitted.'
Evidence Self-Condemning
Damages sought for opening of a highway. A witness for the plaintiff gives the value of the tract before
the opening as $132,000; the value after the opening
$68,775, and the damage as $64,225, (instead of $63,225).
His attention being called to the error, he altered not the
damage but the "value after." The court thought that
the examination showed, beyond any doubt, that he first
figured out the damages, then fixed a value before, and
arrived at the "value after" by deducting the damagex
from the value before.
On motion of defendant, the
court struck out the testimony, and directed the jury
to disregard it. 6
Dictum of Rosenstiel v. Pittsburgh Railways Co.
In the form of a quotation from Delaware and Hudson Canal Co. v. Barnes, 31 Pa. 193, the statement appears,' "we have held that where evidence has been improperly received which tends to prejudice the minds of
the jurors, the error is not cured by an instruction to
disregard it."
No such sentence, so far as we have
discovered, appears in the case, nor is the doctrine expressed in it supported by any decision.
Instruction
to disregard the evidence, may be effectual, if given in
proper time, distinctly and emphatically, so as to warrant the belief that the jury's verdict is not, in any degree, the result of it. Indeed, the sentence following is
in contradiction of that already quoted. "We have said,"
sRobinson v. Snyder, 25 Pa. 203.
dBond
v. City, 15 Dist. 891.
7

Rosenstiel v. Pittsburgh Rways Co., 230 Pa- 273.

vall's Est. v. Darby, 38 Pa. 56.

Cf. Du-
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says the court, "it may be withdrawn by the party who
has given it, or the court may withdraw it and positively
instruct the jury to disregard it-to discard it from their
view. In such a case it is the duty of the court to see
to it that no mischief is done; that the illegal evidence be
withdrawn, wholly withdrawn, and withdrawn for every
purpose." The dictum that error in admitting evidence
cannot be cured by instruction to disregard it is wholly
inconsistent with those cases which say that no error
is committed by the court in refusing to strike out evidence, but that error would be committed, by refusing
to instruct the jury to disregard it.
Criminal Cases
There may be offers of evidence made with no expectation that they will be received, or belief that they
ought to be received, but for the purpose of prejudicing
the jury by innuendoes. In such a case it might be
the duty of the court to withdraw a juror, at the request
of the defendant. In a murder case, certain, offers
were made, which the evidence presented did not sustain. The evidence was formally withdrawn from the
jury. This, says McCollum, J., "is a matter which rests
largely in the discretion -of the trial court, and its exercise of the discretion will not be reviewed except in a
In a murder case against X, evidence
case of abuse."'
of the doings of alleged conspirators with X, was received. If subsequently, no evidence of a relation between
them and X was presented, the court should, on the request of defendant, withdraw the evidence given, 9 and
Corn. v. Crossmire, 156 Pa. 304. The offer mwas made.
The evidence did not support it- In respect to 'What, had the
court discretion? It was its duty to strike out the evidence or
possibly withdraw a juror, at the request of the defendant. Cf.
Coin. v-Duffy, 49 Super. 344.
'Oom. v. Wilson, 186 P&. 1.
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before the charge.10 In prosecution for statutory rape,
a witness was asked whether anything about the female
indicated that there had been sexual commerce.
The
witness said "There was, and she admitted it." The
defendant's counsel at once moved the court to strike
out the hearsay answer. It was error to refuse to do
so.1

Other Than Jury Trials
The jury being assumed capable of divesting their
minds of the influence of evidence which should not have
been heard by them, the same assumption must be made
with respect to an auditor, a referee, a judge of the orphans' court, a judge of the common pleas sitting without a jury. The judge, after hearing evidence, may
strike it out, and refuse to consider it, in making up his
decision.100on v. Zell, 94 Pa. 258. There was error in receiving the
evidence, which was not cured by its subsequent withdrawal in
the charge.
ICom. v. Howe, 35 Super. 554.
1Leware Y. Weaver, 121 Pa. 268, 175.
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MOOT COURT
LEWIS v. FIRE INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Fire Insurance---Subrogation Party

Release of Negligent

STATMENT OF FACTS
Lewis' barn -was insured by the defendant. It was set afire
by the negligent acts of a *Railroad Co. whose locomotives emitted
sparks. The Railroad Co. induced Lewis to accept $100, and exacted a full release of all claims by means of fraudulent representations as to the cause of the fire, the condition of the spark
arrester, etc. Lewis notified it that he repudiated the release and
rwould hold it responsible for -the fire. Not suing it, however,
he brought this action on the fire policy. The defendant claimed non-liability (1) because -thefire was caused by the negligence
of the Railroad Co., and (2) because Lewis had released that
company. The court refused to allow Lewis to show that the
release mas a nullity because procured by fraud.
De Renzo, for the plaintiff.
Barnhardt, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
STRITE, J. ,The question is whether or not the court erred
in refusing -to allow Lewis, the iplaintiff, to show that the release
ss a -nullity because procured by fraud.
The fire baving been caused .by the negligence of the Railroad Co., the insured had a right -to proceed either against the
Railroad Co. because of its negligence, or against the Insurance
Co. on its coyenant to indemnify. Ins. Co. of N. A. v. Fidelity
etc. Co., 123 Pa. 523. A recovery from -the Railroad Co. would
have reimbursed the insured and no recovery could ,aive been
had against .the Insurance Co. And, if this release extinguished
all claim for damages against .the Railroad Co., the plaintiff could
not recover -from the Insurance Co., Carstairs et. al. v. Ins. Co.
of N. Y., 18 Fed. Rep. 473 and Highlands v. C. V. Farmers' Mutual Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 134, (where the insurance company was cre.
li9ved of liability) for the general rul is, that the release of the
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principal debtor, without ithe consent of the surety, releases the
surety. Met. Nat. Bank v. Merohants' and Manufacturers' Bank,
155 Pa. 20.
But, if the release was procured by fraud, it would not be
a good defense in an action by the plaintiff against the Railroad
Co. People's Nat. Gas Co. v. Millburg, 2 Mona. 145. The Insurance Co. is subrogated to the plaintiff's right of action and it
may sue in the namne of the insured even without this consent.
Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Showalter, 3 Super. Ct. 452. If this is the
case, and fraud could be shown, the 'Insurance Co. would not be
wronged 'by permitting the plaintiff to show fraud. If the Insurance Co. could not show that the plaintiff's act worked it a
wrong, it could not set up the act as a defense in this case. Gordon v. McCartey, 3 Whart. 407; Highlands v. Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 184.
In any event, the court should -have permitted the plaintiff
to show that the release wias procured by fraud and was therefore a nullity. In Gordon v. McCarthy, 3 Whart. 407, which is
explained and approved -in 'Highlands v. Ins. Co., 203 Pa. 104,
the court says: "if the giving of the release has occasioned injury to 'the surety, the burden of proving this will lie upon him,
but such -proof cannot 'be interposed as an objection to 'an offer
of evidence to establish fraud.
"The plaintiff should in the first place be given an opportunity to show that his execution of the release was fraudulently
obtained, and if he succeeds in doing so, -the defendant should
then be -permitted to prove as a defense that the plaintiff's act
in signing the instrument worked -him a wrong."
The, plaintiff contends that the refusal of the court to allow the plaintiff to show that -therelease was procured by fraud
was error, as it prevented a proper development of the case and
the fixing of the 'liability. This, we believe to be correct. The
Railroad Co. was notified of the repudiation of the release. The
release could not be successfully pleaded as a bar 'to an aection
between the Insurance Co. and the Railroad Co., because -the Insurance Co. (a stranger to the release) could introduce parol evidence to impeach or reform it. Parol evidence is received when
it is offered by 'hird persons, who, if it were otherwise, might
be -prejudiced by things recited in -the witings, contrary to the
truth, through the ignorance, carelessness, or fraud of 'the parties; and who, therefore, ought not to be precluded from proving
the truth, however contradictory to the written statement of
others." 1 Greenleaf on 'Evidence, 407.
The court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to show that
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the release was procured by fraud and .therefore a nullity.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
This is a suit on a policy of fire insurance. The barn that
was insured has been destroyed by fire. The policy did- not exclude fires occasioned by the negligence of third persons, from
its applications. That the fire was caused by the negligence of
the Railroad Co., is therefore, no reason for refusing to permit
a recovery on the policy.
Lewis, the plaintiff, has accepted a sum of money from the
Railroad Co. and has executed to it a release. The defend4nt,
if it paid the policy, (would be entitled to subrogation to Lewis'
right to recover from the Company. If, without the defendants'
consent, he has ended that right, 'he has discharged the defendant.
Lewis alleges that the release is void, because it 'was procured from him by fraud, and he has repudiated it. It is no obstacle then to his recovering from the Wailroad Co. If not, there
is no obstacle to the subrogation of the defendant Insurance Co,
after it shall have paid the sum due upon the 'policy.
It is not suggested, nor does it (appear, that the making of
the release, and the permdtting some time to elapse before repudiating will -have caused any loss, if recovery is allowed against
the defendant, that the defendant would not have suffered, had
no release been made.
Much is said in the opinion of the lower court, in Highlands
v. Fire Ins. Co. concerning the inadmissibleness of parol evidence,
and the learned trial court seems, under its influence, to have rejected the offered evidence that the release, -procured by fraud,
had been repudiated by Lewis. The observations of the court in
the case cited, are indeed puzzling. They need, 'however, not -perplex us unduly. 'A deed is not so far sacred that it cannot be
reformed.
It may even be annulled. If annulled, it will be annulled, only in consequence of facts: e. g. fraud, mistake, and these
facts amust .be made to appear by evidence. In refusing to hear
evidence, the court has committed itself to one or the other
two untenable positions; either that a deed cannot be annulled by
any proof of Vfaud, or that facts are established in this case
which estop the plaintiff from -availing himself of such proof. If
there (were estopping facts they Would need -to be ascertained
not by the court, but by the jury. As it could not be tforeseen
that the jury would find sudh facts, tba courta anticipation that
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such estopping facts would be found, was no justifietion of ita
refusal to hear -the evidence concerning the fraud.
The judgment of the court below is lffirmed.

HAINES Y. SARAH ]1OLCOIM

Doesdeet~ Eatates--Will-Rule in Shelley's Case
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A devised land to Holcolm for life, and after her death to
her heirs. Holcolm rwas in possession. Haines if he survived,
being her only child, would be -her 'heir. She contended, that
by the rule in Shelley's Case, she obtained a fee simple. Haines
asserted that she had only a life estate. She thereupon, though
in possession, asked the Common Pleas to griant a rule to com
pel Haines to bring an action of ejectment, under the act of
April 16th, 1903, P. L. 212.
Puhak, for -the plaintiff.
Pennel, for the defendant.
OPINION

OF THE COURT

PUDERBAUGHH, J. The questons to be considered are (1)
whether Sarah Holcolm received a fee siriple or a life estate under the devise, and (2) whether she is entitled to a bill compelling Haines to bring un action in ejectment under -the act of
April 16th, 1903, 2 Pur. Dig. 1304, to settle the title to the property in question.
In Gutheries Appeal, 37 Pa. 9, it is stated -that if the intention of the testator is that the remainderman should take as the
-heirs of the grantee or devisee of the -particular freehold, instead
of themselver btcoming the root of a new succession, the rule in
Shelley's Case is applied, although .it may defeat a manifest intention that the first taker should have but an estate for life.
Where there is doubt as to the intention of the testator, the rule
-applies. The one devising -the property must clearly state that

he 'wishes the first devisee to take only a life estate, if 'he 'hopes
to avoid -the fapplication of the rule. "No one can create what in
law is a fee and deprive, the tenant of those essential rights and
-privileges v'hieh the law annexes -to it." Doebler's Appeal, 64
Pa. 9.
In McGregor v. Davidson, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 230, it was hold
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that a devise 'to my son, Daniel, a one-balf interest in ninetythree acres of land situate, etc., during his natural life and then
to go to his legal -heirs," vests an absolute estate in fee simple
in the first devisee. It is clearly a case where the rule in Shelley's Case must be enforced. The foregoing case is a very close
parallel to the one before the court.
The word "heirsP" is held to be "heirs generally" and is treated as such in the application of the rule in Shelley's Case. Nunxerous authorities compel us to construe the word "heirs" in the
present ease in that light.
Although the question of the appliestion of the rule in Shelley's Case has been a bone of contention in our courts, and although it 'has been abolished in many states, it is still the law
in Pennsylvania. In many eases the application of the rule
creates hardships for devisees and violates the intentions of the
testator, but nevertheless still -has some good qualities. Its non
use would cause perpetuities to spring up and land to become
inalienable. It would also make it possible for certain landed
.persons to keep a certain section of land from ever becoming
developed. iMcGregor v. Davidson, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 230.
In the light of the Pennsylviania decisions "wemust, although
against our personal opinion, 'hold that the rule in Shelley's
Case must be applied to the devise to Sarah Holcolm and Haines.
Under the act of April 16th, 1903, supra, -theparty in poseession may obtain a rule on the party not in possession, but
claiming title or interest in property, to bring an action of ejectment within six months -in order to try title.
A rule to compel Haines to bring an action of ejectment is

grante&
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The question in this case is not whether Sarah Holcomb has
a life estate or fee simple but whether -he is entitled to have
that question settled by a .proceeding under the act of April 16,
1903.
The argument of Haines is that since he does not claim a
present right of immediate possession but only as a remainder
man, the act of 1903 is not applicable to the present controversy because as Sarah Holconb is entitled to a life estate, 'he cannot
bring ejectment as he is not entitled to possession.
Were it not for the act of 1903, the facts -of this case would
present a situation which would not justify an action of ejectment. The cases construing this at, however, conclusively show
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that in cases like the present an action of ejectment may be ordered and proceeded with until final judgment. See Cambria Iron
Co. v. Leidy, 226 Pa. 122; Kimmel v. Ghaffer, 219 Pa. 375; Fearl
v. Johnstown, 216 Pa. 205.
The judgment of the learned court below, granting the rule
to bring ejectment, is therefore iffirined.

KIRCHNER v. HENDRICKS
Principal and Surety-Enforcement of Indemnity
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hendricks on Aug. 11, 1916, borrowed $400 from X giying him a note, payable in four months iwith Kironer as surety.
At the same time he gave Kirchner as indemnity a note for the
same amount payable one month from date. Two months later
Kirchner, hearing Hendricks would be insolvent and would not
pay X the borrowed money, entered judgment on his note and
issued execution, levying on the goods of Hendricks. Hendricks
asks the court to -set aside the exec-tion because the principal
debt, that to X, was not yet due and Hendricks had committed
no default.
McGreegor, for the plaintiff.
Miller, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HOLDDRBAUM, X. T1he validity of the promissory note
given by Hendricks to Kirchner, being founded upon the undoubted consideration of Kirchner's individual liability as surety
upon the note given to X, cannot be attacked for -want of consideration. Ifiller v. Howry, 3 P. & W. 347. That a principal
may lawfully give security to his surety and that agreements in
regard thereto are valid is 'well settled. 32 Cyd. 239. The only
question ,therefore, is as to the nature of the indemnity as represented by the note given to Kirchner.
According to 32 Cyc. 247, "The payee of a promissory note
given ,by in principal -to secure the former as surety cannot sue
thereon if it is a mere indemnity against loss, but a promissory
note in ordinary form given to a payee by his principal as collateral security ay be sued on when it maturs notwithstanding
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the debt for Which the payee is surety for the maker -has not
been paid."
There can be no doubt that the note to Kirchner comes under
the latter rule. It is a promissory note in ordinary form given
as collateral security. On its face its validity is not conditioned
upon actual injury to the payee. nor is there evidence of an oral
agreement to that effect. If that had been the intention of the
parties, Hendricks could easily have given an indemnity bond
conditioned upon an actual injury to the surety.
In Miller v.
Howry, 3 P. & W. 374, the giving of the bond and judgment by
the principal to the surety was not contemporaneous rtwth the
making of the principal bonds but subsequent thereto. Nevertheless the individual liability of the surety was held -by Jidge Gibson -to be -asufficient consideration and he was allowed to issue
execution upon the maturity of the bond, although none of the
principal notes had been paid and all were not even due. The
case at bar is even stronger because the validity of the promissory note does not depend upon a condition -ecited therein, whereas the bond -in -the above case twa conditioned upon the payment
of four thousand dollars.
The Pennsylvania cases cited by the counsel for the defense
are not in point. In Borland's Appeals, 66 Pa. 470, the action
,fts upon a bond given to indemnify the surety in case of a
default in quarterly payment; and Morrison v. Berkey, 7 S. and
R. 237, is a case of naked relation of principal and surety, carrying rwdth it the surety's right only to subrogation.
The note to Kirchner was payable' absolutely according to
its terms and therefor at the time mentioned in it, and it does
not matter whether the principal note rwas due or not. The plaintiff was entitled to a judgment and execution in order that his
liability as surety night be discharged. Of course, the proceeds
must be applied to .the payment of the principal note; the surety
cannot convert the same to h-is own use as it is impressed with a
trust in favor of the creditor. Hincken v. 1cGlathery, 8 C. C.
267. The rule to set aside the execution is discharged.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The learned court below properly refused to get aside the execution. The note to the surety promised to pay him a definite
sum of money in one month. The debt for which the payee rwas
liable as surety, was not payable until two months later. Payment of the former was not then, conditioned on the non-payment
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of the latter by the prncipal debtor. The note to Kirchner was
absolutely payable on the day named in it. The -money collected
on it, as the court below says, would be payable by Kirchner to
the primary creditor, in relief of Hendricks.
That such note, given to a surety to indemnify him, mmy
be collected at its maturity, although the debt for .which rthe surety is liable is not yet due, is recognized in Miller v. Howry, 8
P. & W. 374; Bank v. Douglass, 4 W. 95; Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa.
346.
Appeal dismissed.
INSURANCE CO. v. BAGLEY
Principal and Agent-Liability of Insurance Agent to His Principal for Acts of Sub-Agent
STATEMENT OF FACGTS
The plaintiff employed the defendant to solicit fire insurance.
He had caused a policy to be issued to X for one year. The
plaintiff insttucted -him not to renew the insurance of X's property. Bagley had employed a sub-agent, but had not told him not
to deliver any policy to X. The sub-agent issued a renewal
policy to X, whose property was later destroyed by fire, the company, raf4er suit, was compelled to pay dhe amount of the loss.
The company sues Bagley to be reimbursed.
Borton, for the plaintiff.
Miller, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KANE, J. It is unquestionably the law that the Insurance
Company rwas liable for ithe damages sustained to X's property,
hence Bagley, the defendant, cannot defend upon the grounds that
the company v'as not liable.
The question of law, arising frmn the facts of the case at
bar, is wl'etber the -principal is liable to his erployer for the
.-as of his -agent, done in the course of his employment. The
Insurance Co. is the employer, Bagley is the principal, while the
sub-agent --who issued the policy is the agent.
The defendant, Bagley, was acting clearly within his right,
when .he employed a sub-agent. 'We must, therefore, confine ourselves to Bagleyfs liiability for the acts of the sub-agent.
Upon
this 'Point, the cases are numerous ond without -confliet
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In Franklin Insurance Co. v. Bradford, 201 Pa. 32, an analagous case, it was -held by Dean, J.: "Where an agent of an insurance company mwho has power to countersign and issue policies and collect premiums, employs a sub-agent whom 'be pernmits to sign 'his name to the policies, collect premiums and de,posits the money in the bank, and the sub-agent, without the
agent's actual knowledge, issues a policy on a risk which the
-agent had (been expressly forbidden to insure, and 'i loss results to the insurance company by reason of the destruction of
the premises by fire, the agent is liable to the insurance can.
pany for the loss sustained, and -he cannot allege as a defense,
that he had no knowledge of the delivery of the policy, or of the
fact that the sub-agent had received the premium and eposited

the same in the bank to the agent's account."

In many other

cases we find -a more startling doctrine in regard to the prin-

cipal's liability. "The -principal is responsible to third persons for
the acts of his -agent, even though tortious, if done in the course
of 'his employment, although the principal did not authorize the
acts -or may 'have forbidden them."
Phila. & Reading R. R. Co.
v. Derby, 14 Howard 468; Hower v. Ulrich, 156 Pa. 410; Bruner
v. American Telephone Co., 151 Pa. 447.
The .liability of the agent -has been concisely stated in McGonigle v. Isusquehanna Ins. Co., 168 Pa. 1: 'Where a duly au.
thorized insurance agent, in due prosecution of the business of
,his company, employs -another agent as a sub-agent to solicit insurance, the acts of the sub-agent 'have -the same effect as if
done by the agent Fhmself."
In view of the above mentioned decisions, we give judgment
for the plaintiff.

OPINION OF SUPRME COURT
There is a regrettable want of precision in many of the propositions of the learned court below. The question, it states
arising from the facts of the case is 'whether the principal is
liable to his employer for the acts of his agent, done in the course
of 'his employment. The question is, rather, whether, if an agent
employs a sub-agent, and neglects 'to give thim the instruction
necessary to avoid loss to the principal, the agent -will be liable
for the loss occasioned to the principal, by the omission to give
this instruction.
The principa, the Ins. Co., employed Bagley as agent. 'Bagley employed a sub-agent. The sub-agent'. et han involved the
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company in a 'loss which would not 'have occurred, 'had Bagley
given him a certain instruction. The omission of this instruction
was negligence.
The agent implicitly stipulates for the exercise of care, "If
he fails to exercise it, and damage ensues to the principal, he is
responsible." The Company instructed Bagley not to take a certain kind of risk. -Bagley has authorized another to deliver a
policy on -property, w'hich Bagley was directed not to insure. He
has supinely allowed his sub-agent to insure this property. The
property has been destroyed by fire.
The company has under
compulsion paid the policy. The nexus between this compulsory
payment by the Company, and the negligent omission of Bagley
to advise 'his sub-agent, is sufficiently close. The negligence was
the cause of the plaintiff's loss. 'Hence a recovery by the plaintiff from Bagley, was properly allowed. Afirmed.

...
CALHOON v. NEELY
Judgment-Judgment Index-Mortgage-Priority of Lien
STATEMENT OF FAIOTS
The proper name of Mrs. Harrison was Martha A. HeTrison.
Her husband's name was John J. Harrison. On July 7th, 1916,
a judgment 'was entered against Mrs. John J. Harrison, and was
duly indexed. On Sept- 9, 1916, she and -her husband executed a
mortgage to Biddle, in which she styled herself Marth-a A. Harrison. A sale took place on the judgment on Nov. 16, 1916, to
Neely; and another on the judgment sur mortgage in Dec., 1916,
to Calhoon. Possession being -taken by Neely, this is ejectment
by Caihoon.
MacGregor, for the -plaintiff.
Pennal, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BLUMBERG, J. This is an action of ejectment in which the
buyer at the mortgage sale seeks to recover the land from the
buyer iat the judgment sale. It is conceded that if the judgment
wms properly -indexed, Neely is the rightful owner of the property.
This -then is the question -to be considered.
The judgment was entered against the name of -Mrs. John
J-Harrison. Her name recognized by law is Martha A. Harrison.
Is the one who looks thru the defendant docket bound to knoiw
that',Mrs. John J. Harrison and Mrs. Martha A. Harrison are
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one and the same, person? There may have been several Harrisons. It is a common name. Is the searcher bound to look up
the pedigree of each? We -thinkthat this is contrary to justice.
The Act of April 22, 1856, P. L. 532, provides that no lien
or judgment upon any real estate, "shall commence or be continued, as against any purchaser or mortgagee, unless the same
be indexed in the county where the real estate is situated, in
The legislature recognized
a book called the judgment inidex."
that judgments were scattered through numerous dockets and
some provision was necessary 'to flacilitate the fihding of them.
If one was required -to look up every similar surname, regaaSless
of the given name, the purpose of the legislature would be de.
feated.
But what is the effect of the judgment dacket? Simply to
give notice to purchasers, subsequent encumbrancers and all
others in interest. Can it be said that one has had notice 'where
there is a defective entry in the judgment docket? The searcher
is intent on f'nding G certain name and should not be compelled
to look up all names that are shrlar. This would -be too arduous a task. Hence a defective entry is not notice. :Besides the
defendant should not profit -by -his own -negligence. The courts
are unanimous in declaring that "it is the duty of the judgment
creditor to see that this judgment is rightly entered in the jusdiRidgtvay, Budd and Co.'s Appeal, 17 Pa. 303;
ment docket."
Wood v. Reynolds, 7 W. & S. 406.
The law on this subject is well settled in Pennsylvania. In
Esther Hutchinson's Appeal, 92 Pa. 186, the court held that the
omission of the middle letter of a name in the judgment index
was fatal to the lien. In Hamilton's Appeal, 103 Pa. 368, it was
held that a judgment entered and indexed in the name of a firm,
and not -in the names of the individuals composing such firm,
will be postponed to the claim of a subsequent lien creditor, with.
out notice, whose judgm nt is properly indexed in the name of
the several partners composing the firm.
These decisions have been followed in the late case of Penna.
Savings Bank v. -George, 201 Pa. 4*1. The court there held that
"where a judgment is entered against a married woman under
her husband's name and initials preceded by the word "Mrs.,"
and is indexed in the judgment index under the same name, and
such wonasn subsequently executes a mortgage in -her own name,
the lien of the judgment will be postponed to that of the mortgage."
In view of the above decisions, we think that this action of
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ejectment should be upheld, and judgment given for the (plaintiff, the buyer at -the mortgage sale.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
If the sale on the judgment discharged the mortgage, the
-purchaser at that sale, dbtained a title which was not divesteld by
the suJbsequent sale on the judgment sur mortgage. Ordinarily
a sale on an earlier lien discharges all later liens.
The judgment -was against Mrs. John J. Harrison.
This
name of the defendant -indicated that it was not the original name
of the defendant, but the name acquired by her through marriage.
Harrison iwas a derived name. So, Mrs. John J- Harrison
was a derived name. A judgment against her, in her pre-nuptial
name WMartha A. Holdich, would not be a lien as against ia later
judgment against her -in her marriage-name, Harrison, because
later lienors would not be bound to know what her maiden name
-had been.
But, when the name indicdates that the defendant is a married
iwoman, -and when it -purports to give the name of her husband, are later lienors bound to know or learn when -they
see a jvidgment against a woman unfder the -husband's name, 1with
the word Mrs. before it, what the feminine Christian name is?
Was Biddle, w'hen he took his mortgage, or Oalhoon rwhen he
bought the land at the mortgage sale, bound to know that Mrs.
John J. H., be'ng a married woman, who had by marriage acquired the name of Harrison, was Martha A. Harrison? It is
-possible for a person to have two names. If -in one transaction,
he calls himself Harper, and in another Hoover, and he is as -well
'known, in the neifhborhood under one as under the other of these
names, why should a lien under one name not be valid, as against
a later lien under the other? If the community is bound to know
a man's single name, iwhy, if he in flact has two names, both used
numeroisly, is it not bound to know both names? Why -should
a judgment against -him under one name, not be treated as known
to be aginst him, by one who has accepted a later judgment
against hin under the other name?
A married woman really has two names. Mrs. Harrison had
the name Mrs. John J- H. and also -the name Martha A. or Mrs.
alartha A. Harrison. Why do we not insist that, as creditors
should lncnw tbat she 'had ceased to be Holdich and become Harrisen, that is, that she was -the wife of Harrison, so they should
know that the Harrison of whon she was the wife, was John J., and
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that -it is as usual for the wife -to be called Mrs. Jofhn J. as Mrs.
Martha A.?
But it is useless to contend against the policy iwhich bas been
authentatively announced.
The mortgagee, in this case, though
he would have seen, had he consulted the docket and the index,
a :judgment against Mrs. John J. Harrison, twas not bound to
knov that this was a judgment against the wife of John J. and
that Martha A. Harrison was another name for the same person.
Ignorant of this fact, then, the judgment did not seem to
Biddle to be against his mortgagor. He had no reason. to think
that the sale on that judgment, would pass the title of the mortgagor to the purchaser. Nor 'had Calhoon.
Hence Neely, the
purchaser at the judgment sale, while he obtained the title, as
against the defendant therein, did not acquire it, as against Biddle, or Calhoon.
The sale on ,the mortg'aige passed as good a
title as would have passed, had there been no judgment and earlier sale thereupon. All this is implied -in Savings & Loan Association v. George, 201 Pa. 43.
Hence the judgment of the
learned court below is affirmed.

3OOK REVIEW
Handbook of Criminal Procedure, by Win. L. Clark, Jr. Second Edition by William E. Mikell, B. S., L.L. M. Dean of the Law School of
the University of Pennsylvania, The West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1918.
Of the many excellent Hornbooks published for the use of students, those
prepared by Win. L. Clark, Jr. are among the best. The author of the
second edition, justifies his revision of the original, in part by the reminder
that twenty-two years have gone, since, the appearance of the original. We
have examined the second edition with some care. Besides being an excellent
compend, in over 700 pages, of the law of Criminal Procedure, it proves to
be a most readable book. It is clear, full, accurate, and, a quality that is
somewhat rare, very interesting. There is in it a refreshing note of originality. The author does not at times, hesitate to reveal an impatience, a
scorn even, for some of the foolish decisions that disfigure the rules of procedure. On page 206 he despairingly confesses that "it is impossible to
reconcile the decisions" concerning the effects of errors in the descriptions
inindictments of the crimes therein charged. In one case, the indictment
was held void, because the word father was spelled "farther."
It is impossible to go into any detail, in pointing out the excellences of this book. We
may call attention to the very satisfactory discussions of various points in the

law of criminal evidence. The remarks on Confessions are particularly lucid
and yet succinct.
The book should be in the hands, not of students only but of every attorney who has occasion to practice in the criminal court. It is in all respects,
a satisfactory treatise.

